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COMBINING R & D AND FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION
IN A SINGLE CONTRACT

John W. Simmons
Contracts Manager
Radiation Incorporated
Melbourne, Florida
Instead of basing the type of contract on the above,
the type of contract is often influenced by the following:

SUMMARY
During the past three years there has been a concentrated
effort by the Government to shift from Cost-Plus-Fixed
Fee Contracts to Incentive Contracts. The basic purpose
of this shift is to put more of the burden of financial
risk on the contractor and to reward contractors who
successful ly perform on their contracts with higher profits.

1.

Meeting statistical goals showing a shift toward
Incentive and Fixed Price contracts.

2.

Inadequate project funds or internal administra
tive directives and pressures do not permit the
Government to assume the. risk of a cost
Hence, straight Fixed Price is used
overrun.
where, based on the conditions surrounding the
particular procurement, CPIF or FPI should
Use of a contract type of a
have been used.
higher order than is appropriate for the procure
ment conditions requires tke contractor to either
bit a large contingency or assume a higher risk
than sound business judgment would dictate. In
such cases the small but perhaps more efficient
businessman must no-bid because he cannot afford
to take such a risk. The result is a restriction
on competition and a strong possibility of higher

Another trend is developingof combining R & D, Production
and Logistics Support into a single contract based upon
Air Force Secretary Charles 1 "Total Package Concept 1 '.
Since the purpose of these changes is to shift more
risks from the Government to the Contractor, the tendency
is often to select the type of contract whereby the contractor
assumes the maximum risk. This of course is the Fixed
However, due to the nature of the
Price Contract.
circumstances surrounding the procurement, the Fixed
Price Contract may not be the most appropriate nor
in the best interests of the Government.

overall cost to the Government.
of this Article is to describe a type of
The purpose
Contract for use when it is desired to combine R & D
In designing this
and Production in a single contract.
contract, it is a goal to reduce or eliminate problems
which have caused concern to the Government and still
not go to the extreme and require the contractor to assume
more risk than sound business judgment would dictate.

In the past, DOD has used the following guidelines for
determining the type of contract appropriate for a particular
procurement:

COMBINING R & D AND FOLLOW-ON PRODUCTION IN
A SINGLE CONTRACT
As a result of Defense Secretary McNamara's famous
11 July 1963 Press Conference on cost reduction, there
has been an intensive effort by both DOD and NASA to
shift from Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) to Incentive
Type Contracts.
Since Government procurement envelops the total span
of the research and development spectrum as well as the
procurement of hardware and services, it is obvious that
one type of contract will not fitall procurement situations.
It is also basic to our free enterprise system that high
incentives breed high performance.

2.

Is the work sufficiently
accurate pricing?

3.

Is there sufficient cost history to permit accurate
pricing?

4.

Are there unknowns which require large con
tingencies in pricing?

5.

What are the possible maximum and minimum
costs?

defined

to

Development programs and some initial
production. Development programs, by de
have no state-of-the-art
will
finition,
problems, satisfactory specifications, and
of
management
require
merely
will
engineers.

FPI

Initial production where cost data
sufficient to permit fixed price.

FP

Production where competition or cost data
is sufficient to determine fair and reasonable
price.

1.

is

not

The desire to have the initial production ac
complished by the R & D contractor because
the R & D contractor's knowledge of the
program technical requirements.

of

things as:
Is the requirement within the state-of-the-art?

Research programs where the state-of-theart is being pushed and feasibilities proven.

CPIF

During the past year some agencies of Government have
been giving consideration to combining the R & D phase
and the production phase in a single contract. Some of
the reasons given for this are:

There is no argument with the basic principles involved
in the shift from Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee to Cost-PlusIncentive-Fee, Fixed Price Incentive and Fixed Price
Contracts. However, the selection of the type of contract
should be based upon the circumstances of the specific
and not by pressures external to the
procurement
Consideration must be given to such
procurement.

1.

CPFF

permit
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2.

Too much time is lost between the R & D
phase and production phase if a new competitive
be run prior to
must
cycle
procurement
production.

3.

Unless an initial production is accomplished by
the R & D contractor, production drawings are
not sufficiently accurate and complete to permit
a new competitive procurement which will be
void of scope changes caused by incorrect
drawings and specifications.

4.

When R & D is procured separately, the R & D
contractor may ' 'buy-in' ' on the R & D contract
with the expectation of recovering losses on a
sole source production follow-on.

Since a combined R & D and production contract on a
CPFF, CPIF or FPI basis still permits the use of the
"buy-in 11 technique, the trend has been toward Fixed
Price even though the procurement may involve substantial
development, no cost history, and many cost unknowns.

This type of contract is very risky for the contractor
when it is known in advance that state-of-the-art is
involved.
The Fixed Price contract is essentially the same as
Fixed Price Incentive except the contractor must include
in the price an allowance for contingencies.
If the
contingencies do not occur then the allowance becomes
profit.

It therefore appears that a new type of contract is
needed to cover combined R & D and production contracts
which involve high financial risks and cost unknowns.
It is the purpose of this article to describe such a
contract.

Final determination on the type of contract for Phase
1 should be a part of the contract negotiations.

In developing a contract for this type of procurement,
consideration should be given to the fo I lowing requirements:
1.

The contract should discourage buy-in on the
R & D phase with the goal of making up losses
on production.

2.

The contract should discourage inflating costs
in the R & D phase with the view of obtaining
a higher price on the production phase.

3.

The contract should protect the contractor
from severe financial loss due to unforeseeable
circumstances which are beyond the control of
the contractor but inherent in a development
program with many cost unknowns.

4.

Protect the contractor from default on the
production phase because the R & D phase
turns out to be an impossible task.

Phase 1 1 for the production could be included as a part
of the original contract or as an option in the original
contract.
The advantage of including Phase 11 as an
option is that at the conclusion of Phase 1 the Government
may elect not to exercise the option and go out jm
competitive bids without having to go through termination
proceedings. Whether an option or as part of the basic
contract, the contractor is not liable for Phase 11 until
phase 1 is accepted.
The type contract for Phase 11 would be Fixed Price
Incentive with successive targets. This is not a new type
contract because it is currently contemplated by ASPR in
ASPR 3-404.4.
For purposes of illustration, following is an example
Fixed Price Incentive contract with successive targets
as envisioned for this type procurement.
All of the
dollar values, percentages and ratios would be negotiable.
However, typical values have been used in the example.

The proposed contract consists of two phases. Phase
1 (R & D) for the design development fabrication and
test of the first unit or system inlcuding all required
documentation such as drawings, specifications, manuals,
test procedures, spare parts lists, etc.

The initial R & D contract would contain a formula for
determining the elements of a Fixed Price Incentive firm
contract upon completion of the R & D phase using cost
data accumulated during the R & D phase.

Phase II is for the follow-on production.

A typical example of the formula is as follows:

Phase I for the R & D could be either Cost Plus Fixed
Fee, Cost Plus Incentive Fee, Fixed Price Incentive
or perhaps Fixed Price depending upon the final spe
cifications negotiated.

Initial Target Cost
Initial Target Profit
Minimum Profit
Maximum Profit
Final Cei ling Price

There are some advantages offered to the Government
by each type not offered by the others.

$90M
$10M
$ 3M
$17M
120% Final (Firm)
Target Cost

ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS:
The
CPFF
direction by
control.

offers greatest
flexibility for technical
the Government but at a sacrifice of cost

The CPIF has been found generally to be more suitable
for R & D because of the administrative flexibility
desired where there may be numerous scope changes
which often occur as the development program progresses
and which require fast reaction but at the same time
contains incentive for cost control. CPIF is also more
of a best efforts contract which is used where technical
achievement may not be possible.
The Fixed Price Incentive offers to the Government
the advantage of a maximum price for which it will be
obligated.
It also requires specific performance by
the contractor in that all specifications must be met.
If they are not met the Government has a choice of
defaulting the contractor or reducing the specifications
to those actually achieved.

A.

Minimum profit shall be reached at the point
where costs equal 130% of initial target cost.

B.

Maximum profit shall be reached at the point
where costs equal 80% of initial target cost.

C.

The formula for determining the firm target
profit is displayed graphically In Graph No. 1
and is developed by joining points A, B, C, D
and E by straight lines between the consecutive
points.
These points represent the following:

POINT
A.

Maximum

B.

Maximum
cost

Profit

($17M)

all

points

below

Profit

(517M) at 80%

initial

target

at

S72M cost
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If Firm Target Cost equals S105M, then Firm Target
Profit = $10M + ($90M - $104M) .26 =$6.1M

initial

target

130% initial

target

If Firm Target Cost equals $80M, then Firm Target
Profit = $10M +($90M - $80M) .39 - $13,9M

Minimum Profit ($3M) at all points above $1 17M
cost

During the initial contract negotiations, the share ratios
which will be applicable to the final P'hase 11 contract
are negotiated and included as part of the initial contract.

profit

($10M)

C.

Initial target
cost ($90M)

D.

Minimum profit ($3M) at
cost (130% x $90M = $117M)

E.

at

This series of interconnecting lines (AB, BC, CD and
DE) represent graphically the formula for determining
the firm target profit.

Typical share
fol lows:
1.

Upon completion of Phase 1 or at the point near com
pletion of Phase 1 where the design and fabrication
of the first system is sufficiently complete that the
design is frozen and it is proven that the design meets
all specifications, then the cost of Phase 11 is reestimated using the historical cost data from Phase 1 plus
new vendor quotes for materials and subcontracts and
a firm target cost for Phase 11 is negotiated.

2.

Firm Target Cost between Initial Target Cost
and 130% of Initial Target Cost:
Overrun:
Underrun:

For example:

3.
$ 3M
$ 6.1M
$10M
$17M

$130M
S105M
$ 90M
$ 70M

Overrun:
Underrun:

Maximum Profit - Target
Initial Target Cost - 80%
Target Cost

=

$17M - $10M
$90M - $72M

=

$18M =

80/20
80/20

Assuming that the Firm Target Cost is $110,000,000,
the incentive formula will be as shown In Graph No. 2
and consists of the followingas shown in Table I.

Profit
Initial

The dashed lines on Graph 2 represent the incentive
formula for the final Fixed Price Incentive contract
for Phase 1 1 and superseded the formula represented
by the solid lines.

7M
=

Firm Target Cost less than Initial Target Cost:

After completion of the negotiations of the Firm Target
Cost, the final Fixed Price Incentive formula for Phase
1 1 can be structured.

Although the formula for determining firm target profit
has been shown graphically, it can also be calculated
The slopes of the lines BC and CD
mathematically.
are equivalent to share ratios and can be calculated
as follows:

,39
If desired, the Firm Target Cost and Profit for Phase
1 1 can be combined with the cost and profit on Phase 1
(if Phase 1 Is FPI, CPIF or CPFF) and the final contract
firm target cost and profit can cover both Phase 1 and
Phase 11. For example:

This is the same as a 61/39 share ratio where the con
tractor's share is 39..

The Slope of CD =

90/10
90/10 down to initial target cost, then
80/20 below initial target cost

Firm Target
Profit Is:

If Firm Target
Cost Is:

Slope of BC

which might be negotiated are as

Overrun: 95/5 to ceiling
100/0 down to 130% of initial target
Underrun:
cost, then
90/10 down to initial target cost, then
80/20 below initial target cost

By going to the Graph (Graph No. 1) the firm target
profit is determined by locating the firm target cost
and picking the point where the firm target cost inter
sects the profit line.

The Slope of BC

ratios

If the Firm Target Cost is' equal to or greater
than 130% of Initial Target Cost, the share
ratios are as follows:

Initial Target Profit - Minimum Profit
130% Initial Target Cost - Initial
Target Cost

Using Graph 2, the firm Phase 1 1 formula is as shown
in Tab Jell.

Slope of CD -

$ 7M
$10M - $3M
$117M - $90M= $27M = .26

Assume that Phase 1 was CPFF with an estimated cost
of $10,000,000 and fixed fee of $800,000. Further assume
that the final cost was $15,000,000. Phase 1 when added
to the firm Phase ]1 formula would give the results shown

This is the same as a 74/26 share ratio where the con
tractor's share is 26.

in Table 111.
The firm target profit can therefore be calculated mathe
If it Is desired to break the contract into pieces to cover
multi-year funds, this can also be accomplished by bidding
the first year alone; by bidding the 1st and 2nd years
together; by bidding the 1st, 2nd and 3rd together, etc.

matically as follows:
Firm Target Profit = Initial Target Profit + (Initial
Target Cost - Firm Target Cost) Contractor's Share
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Graphs 3 and 4 show two additional examples for two
different firm target costs.
The Graphs are based on the following examples shown
in Table IV.
To illustrate that this concept will discourage under
estimation of initial target costs and discourage trying
to inflate costs in Phase 1 to achieve a higher target
cost in Phase 11, let's look at two examples:
Example 1 - Suppose the original estimate to
do the job was $110,000,000 but in order to get
the job, the contractor bid an initial target cost
of $90,000,000 realizing that the firm target
would be based on Phase 1 actual cost data.
Assume that Phase 1 actual costs showed that a
firm target of $110,000,000 was reasonable for
Phase 11 and that actual costs turned out to be
$110,000,000.
Based upon the above formula,
the contractor's actual profit would be about
$4,800,000 (see Graph No. 5 Point B).
If he
had
originally
bid
an
initial target cost
of $110,000,000 his profit would have been
$12,200,000 (Point A).
Therefore, the underbid
cost $7,400,000 in profit with no way of making
it up since this is the total production requirement.
Example 2 - Assume an initial target cost of
$90,000,000 with initial target profit, maximum
profit, minimum profit and share ratios as in
Graph No. 6, and suppose the Phase 1 costs
show that the $90,000,000 is a good figure for
production but in order to get a high ceiling in
Phase 1 1, the contractor pads his numbers and
negotiates a firm target cost of $1 10,000,000.
In this case, the profit based on a $90,000,000
actual cost would be about $6,800,000 (see Graph
No. 6 Point A). If he had not padded his figures
and used the $90,000,000 as a firm target, the
profit would have been $10,000,000 (Point B) so
he gave up $3,200,000 in profit to get a higher
cei ling.
From these two examples, it can be seen that the con
tractor maximizes his profit when the firm target cost
is less than the initial target cost. Competition in the
initial procurement keeps the contractor fromoverbidding
on the initial target cost.
This approach, therefore,
offers the contractor a powerful profit incentive: (1)
To give his best true estimate of the initial target cost;
(2)
To find ways of reducing production costs through
cost conscious engineering design; (3) Upon completion
of Phase 1, to give his best true estimate of the firm
target cost; and (4) Throughout Phase 1 1 to continue
to find ways to reduce costs.
This approach also reduces the severe risk imposed by
a straight Fixed Price contract on a program with
R & D and inadequate cost data for bidding Fixed Price,
and thereby permits many companies to bid who would
otherwise be forced to withdraw from the competition.
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TABLE I

Firm Target Cost:
Firm Target Profit:
Ceiling (120% Firm Target Cost)
Share Ratios: Overrun
Underrun

$110,000,000
4,800,000
132,000,000
90/10 to Ceiling
90/10 to $90,000,000
80/20 under $90,000,000

TABLE II
$110,000,000
$ 4,800,000
120% Firm Target Cost
($132M)
90/10 to Ceiling
90/10 to $90M
80/20 under $90M

Firm Target Cost
Firm Target Profit
Final Ceiling
Share Ratios:

Overrun
Underrun

TABLE III
Combined
Phase 1 & II

Firm Phase II

Change
Add $15M
(Phase 1 Cost)
Add $.8M
(Phase 1 Fee)
Add $15.8M
(Phase 1 Cost & Fee)

$125M

None
Add $15M
(Phase 1
Add $15M
(Phase 1

90/10 to Ceiling
90/10 to $105M

Firm! Target Cost

$110M

Firm Target Profit

$4.8M

Final Ceiling

$132M

Share Ratio:
Overrun
Underrun

90/10 to Ceiling
90/10 to $90M
80/20 under $90M

to Limit
Cost)
to Limit
Cost)

$5.6M
$147.8M

80/20 to $105M

TABLE IV

Graph 3
Firm Target Cost
Firm Target Profit
Ceiling
Share Ratios: Overrun
Underrun

$13.9M
$96M
80/20
80/20
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Graph 4
$117M
$ 3M
$140M
95/5 to Ceiling
90/10 to $90M
80/20 under $90M
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